Did MERCOSUR affect interstate Brazilian trade ?. by Yücer, Aycil & Siroën, Jean-Marc
1 
 
Did MERCOSUR affect interstate Brazilian trade? 
WORK IN PROGRESS 
 
Jean-Marc SIROEN 1,2 




We consider the effect of MERCOSUR on trade between Brazilian states and on trade of 
Brazilian states with the rest of the world. We use a gravity model to shed light on the 
possible diversion effect of MERCOSUR. Thanks to the data on inter-state trade only for 
four years including one available year for the pre-MERCOSUR period (1991).  We show 
that MERCOSUR led to an increase of trade of Brazilian states with member countries 
however without neither affecting intra-state trade nor trade of  Brazilian  states  with 
third countries. The paper also shows the lack of integration of the Northern region. 
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In 2000, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) considered that by introducing the transaction costs of 
international trade (transport costs, tariffs and nontariff barriers and other transaction costs), the 
international macroeconomists should be able to solve the six leading empirical puzzles that they 
have met since 1975s. One of them was the McCallum's home bias (McCallum, 1995) who 
estimated  that  trade  between  provinces  within  Canada  was  22  times  of  the  expected  trade 
between the Canadian provinces and the  U.S.  The inclusion of  control  variables in the used 
gravity model, including the distance between regions and their size, authorized the author to 
attribute this huge “home bias” to a “border effect” as a large impediment to trade. Since this 
seminal work, the border effect has been lowered thanks to refined econometric methods that 
better deal with the omitted variables bias and the size heterogeneity, obviously important for the 
US-Canadian trade (Helliwell, 1998; Wolf, 2000; Anderson & van Wincoop, 2003; Balistreri & 
Hillberry, 2007).  
Other empirical studies have concerned other countries like China (Poncet, 2003; 2005), Japan 
(Okubo, 2004) or EU (Chen, 2004). However, to estimate the border effects for other countries or 
regions have been confronted with a lack of data in regional trade. Concerning Brazil, many 
authors have used such data, only available for 4 years (1991, 1997, 1998, 1999): Daumal & 
Zignago (2010),  Leusin & alii (2009),  Silva & alii (2007), Arinos de Mello  &  Franco Neto 
(2003), Hidalgo & Vergolino (1998). They all used a gravity model. 
As other Latin American and many developing countries, Brazil has led an "import-substitution" 
strategy and stayed for a long time very little open to international trade. Brazil has attempted to 
take advantage of its status of subcontinent to promote internal trade. From 1950s and during the 
military dictatorship (1964-1985), the governments have led protectionist and industrial policies 
in order to diversify the production structure considered as too focused on primary goods. This 
strategy was closely associated with regional policies, led at the federal level, through  the 
infrastructure investment (e.g. the Transamazonian road) and increased attractiveness  for foreign 
capital in order to produce manufactured goods mainly dedicated to Brazilian market (creation of 
the  Manaus  Free  Trade  Zone  in  1967).  However,  the  “Brazilian  miracle"  turned  into  an 
inflationary and over-indebtedness economy. The return to democracy  strengthened the federal 3 
 
system by giving larger rights  to states and municipalities (Constitution of 1988) and, starting 
from the90’s, the openness to international trade has been implemented, first within the regional 
framework of MERCOSUR (Treaty of Asunción, 1991) and after, with the rest of the world. 
However, unlike other Latin American countries (e.g. Chile, Mexico, Peru), Brazil is still less 
active in preferential trade agreements not only with regional partners, but also with more distant 
countries. 
The Vinerian and post-Venerian literature on the impact of RTAs on trade usually considers 
member countries as fully integrated entities and therefore ignores the regional consequences of 
such  agreements.  The  trade  creation/diversion  effect  only  plays  between  member  and  third 
countries, not inside countries, what is highly debatable for a country as fragmented as Brazil.  It 
is exactly this gap that “border effect” literature should permit to fulfill.  
This context of relative rapid Brazilian openness in 1990s and the availability of data for the 
period give the opportunity to study Brazilian border’s effect, eventually going further than post-
McCallum’s  puzzle  i.e.  considering  the  Brazilian  states  as  trade  entities  arbitrating  between 
internal and external markets, the former including the trade between  Brazilian states and  the 
latter is with foreign countries. 
The aim of this paper is to consider the consequences of MERCOSUR on the direction of trade of 
Brazilian states and to determine if the trade agreement generated a net trade creation or a net 
trade diversion effect on Brazilian internal trade as well as with other member countries.   
2. Previous works and renewed problematic 
For a country like Brazil, which suffers from strong regional inequalities and whose internal 
market is highly fragmented, the differences in welfare gains from MERCOSUR might strongly 
be different among 27 states (26+Federal District).  Using available inter-state trade data, some 
authors have quantified this internal fragmentation comparatively with the level of integration of 
Brazilian states to world market.  
Hidalgo and Vergolino (1998) find that Brazilian inter-state exports are 11.5 times larger than 
exports from states to foreign countries (cross-section for 1991). However, the model is highly 
biased by the absence of country/state fixed effects to control for heterogeneity bias and by the 4 
 
elimination of zero observations. By pooling the data for the four available years (1991, 1997, 
1998, 1999), Paz and Franco (2003) obtain results in border effect measures which are sometimes 
implausible. Results are actually sensitive to different methods (inclusion of country/state fixed 
effects, treatment of  zero observations).  Using the same data for inter-state and international 
trade, Daumal & Zignago (2010) not only focus on the “home bias” but also on the Brazilian 
inter-state integration relatively to the intra-state trade. After controlling by size, distance and 
heterogeneity (country/state fixed effects), they show that Brazilian states trade 38 times more 
between each other than with foreign countries. Leusin & alii (2009) and Silva & alii (2007) find 
very similar results for the same time period. 
Daumal & Zignago (2010) point out that, despite the fact of significant progresses in integration 
policies, the Brazilian market is still fragmented, but less than China (Poncet, 2005). Actually, the 
internal border effect relative to intrastate trade is equal to 23 in 1991, even decreasing to 13 in 
1999. Note that in 1999 and in average, a Brazilian state trade 460 times more with itself than 
with a foreign county.  
Beyond the debate concerning the bias frequently encountered in gravity models, this relative 
fragmentation originates mainly from historically unequal and disjointed development among 
different  Brazilian  regions  hardly  corrected  by  the  integrative  regional  policies,  high  internal 
transport costs due to the lack of infrastructures and large inter-regional inequalities accompanied 
by differences in consumption preferences. Even cyclically floating between recentralization and 
decentralization periods, Brazil is a Federal country with a large autonomy of states concerning  
the  regulation  and  fiscal  policy  domain.  For  example,  the  main  Brazilian  VAT  (ICMS)  is 
perceived  at  state  level  and  introduces  distortions in  inter-state trade  (see Brami and Siroen, 
2007). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Brazil is not only an economy relatively closed to trade with 
foreign countries, but moreover each state was more (Northern states) or less (Southern states) 
closed to trade with other states.  
We  consider  that  the  Brazil’s  openness  to  international  trade  in  the  1990s,  especially  in  the 
MERCOSUR framework, provoked a shock that affected the arbitration between the accessible 
directions of trade for Brazilian states. We can expect that this openness might be detrimental to 5 
 
internal trade, because some states might prefer to trade with relatively more accessible foreign 
countries instead of other states, especially in the MERCOSUR area. It might be less costly for 
Paulistan firms to export to opening Argentina than to Amazonian states. If this hypothesis is 
verified,  it  would  mean  that  the  integration  of  Brazil  to  regional  (MERCOSUR)  and  world 
markets  might  contravene  the  traditional  Brazilian  objective  to  promote  a  more  integrated 
Brazilian market. However, this assumption can be contradicted by the fact that expansion of 
international trade might induce more labor division and specialization inside Brazil and then 
boosting inter-state trade, in a global trend to vertical specialization. 
3. Methodology 
Recent empirical studies concerning the impact of RTAs on trade as well as the post McCallum 
literature on “border effects” usually use gravity models, which estimate the expected bilateral 
trade  with  several  control  variables  including  size  and  different  measures  of  distance 
(geographical, cultural, institutional, etc.). The challenge is to link both problematic worked out 
conventionally apart from each other.  For that purpose, we have to consider Brazil not as a single 
integrated  country  but  as  a  huge  and  unaccomplished  free  trade  area  gathering  27  different 
countries. 
However, since we use a database between the entities from different administrative division 
levels (states and countries) and with several sub groups of trade pairs identified by dummy 
variables (Brazilian State-Brazilian State, Brazilian State-MERCOSUR Country, Brazilian State-
Non MERCOSUR Country;  MERCOSUR country-MERCOSUR country, Non MERCOSUR 
Country- Non MERCOSUR Country
1) the choice of the reference group becomes an important 
and complicated task for a viable estimation of the counterfactual. The impact of MERCOSUR 
can vary in size and in direction for different sub groups of the sample, thus we need to control 
for  its  impact  on  every  sub  groups  individually  and  use  a  unique  reference  group  for  the 
comparability reasons. 
                                                 
1  For  example,  respectively :  Minas  Gerais-Para ;  Minas  Gerais-Argentina;  Minas  Gerais-Germany; 
Germany-Japan 6 
 
The gravity model used in this paper follows the theoretical rationale introduced by Anderson & 
van Wincoop (2003). According to the model A&vW (2003), trade between two units depends on 
their bilateral trade costs as well as the trade costs that they face with the rest of world.  
MERCOSUR, while decreasing directly the trade costs between local units and member countries 
(e.g. Minas  Gerais-Argentina),  changes  also  the  relative importance  of  the trade  costs in  the 
country compared to the trade costs with third countries (e.g. Minas Gerais-Germany) as well as 
the  trade  costs  between  Brazilian  States  (e.g.  Minas  Gerais-Para)  even  though  it  remains 
unchanged in absolute terms. In this perspective, the MERCOSUR created a shock on internal 
and external trade costs of Brazil and changed the internal and international trade structure of the 
country.  
A&vW (2003) call the relative trade costs of the country with its trade partners as Multilateral 
Resistance (MR), which have to be included to avoid an omitted variable bias in the regression. 
The usual way to deal with this issue is to introduce country (exporter and importer) fixed effects, 
which are simple dummy variables attached to each country (or Brazilian State). 
Theory induced gravity model is : 
 
Where   is the bilateral cost of trade between i and j; while   and   are the measures of 
MRs.  This  equation  can  be  augmented  with  many  structural  and  policy  variables  having  an 
impact on trade volumes and trade costs, e.g. contiguity, common language, common colonizer 
… or RTAs.  
Following the trade diversion literature, we will augment the model introduced by A&vW with 
the  variables  measuring  trade  creation  impact  of  MERCOSUR,  trade  diversion  impact  of 
MERCOSUR  on  Brazil’s  trade  with  rest  of  the  world  and  the  trade  moved  from    Brazilian 
internal market to MERCOSUR countries   
The empirical model used in this paper controls for the multilateral resistance by introducing time 
invariant exporter and importer fixed effects. Besides the basic variables of the traditional gravity 7 
 
model (exporter and importer GDPs, bilateral distance), we also control for contiguity (common 
border). Variables of interest measure the trade diversion of MERCOSUR from Brazilian internal 
market and international market, as well as its trade creation between member countries.    
Since Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006), many economists prefer the usage of PPML (Poisson 
Pseudo  Maximum  of  Likelihood)  estimator  over  the  conventional  log-normal  methods  in  the 
gravity equation estimations. In fact, there are many limits in the log-normal specification of the 
gravity models. First, the estimation models requiring a logarithmic transformation result with 
inefficient  estimated  parameters  and  rise  the  inconsistency  since  the  error  terms  are 
heteroscedastic and their expected values depend on the regressors of the model. Second, PPML 
estimator is a useful tool to deal with zero trade values which hide an important amount of 
information explaining why some countries are trading very little. The log-linearization returning 
zero trade values to missing data points can cause a bias in the estimation, especially when the 
zero trade outcomes are not randomly distributed.   
However,  the  equidispersion  assumption    of  PPML  estimator  considers  the 
conditional variance of the dependent variable being equal to its conditional mean. Since this 
assumption  is  unlikely  to  hold,  Santos  &  Tenreyro  (2006)  advocate  for  the  estimation  of 
statistical inferences based on an Eicker-White robust covariance matrix estimator.  
According to Burger & alii (2009), depending on the reason why the conditional variance is 
higher than conditional mean, due to overdispersion or excess of zero trade flows or both, other 
estimators of  Poisson family  (Negative Binomial and Zero Inflated Poisson) can be pursued. 
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  Negative  binomial  specification  accounts  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity,  which  rises  from  an  omitted  variable  bias.  The  distribution  equation  of  this 
specification is adjusted for the overdispersion; yet its variance is a function of the conditional 
mean  ( )  and  the  dispersion  parameter  (α).  Another  possible  cause  of  the  violation  of  the 
equidispersion assumption of PPML can be found in excess zeros in trade volumes hiding the two 
latent groups: first, zero trade flows whose trade probability are exactly zero and the second 
group having positive trade potential.  
Frankel (1997) tells that zero trade outcomes originate mostly from the lack of trade between 
small and  distant  countries. Rauch (1999)  adds  the lack  of historical  and  cultural  links as  a 8 
 
possible reason of zero trade between country pairs. Negative binomial specification introducing 
the overdispersion parameter in distribution is a comprehensible statistical  choice; however it has 
no economical explanation for excess zeros. Further, this model is based upon a gamma mixture 
of Poisson distribution whose conditional variance is a quadratic function of its conditional mean. 
As Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) mentioned, within the power-proportional variance functions, 
the estimators assuming the conditional variance as being equal to higher powers of conditional 
mean  gives  more  weight  to  observations  from  smaller  countries  whose  data  quality  is 
questionable.  
In this perspective, we use a Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model (Lambert (1992); Greene (1994); 
Long (1997)) accounting for two latent groups, one is strictly zero for whole sample period and 
the other which has the positive trade potential, either trading or not. The first part of the model is 
a logit regression estimating the probability of belonging to “never-trading group”, while second 
part is a Poisson regression.  
We consider that Zero-inflated model is a stronger methodological tool compared to Negative 
binomial model to solve the overdispersion problem in gravity model of trade since it has a 
theoretical  rational besides its  statistical value.  Thus,  we  in  this  paper  use  two  estimators:  a 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model (PPML) following Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) 
and Zero-inflated Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood model (ZIPPML) from modified Poisson 
estimator  family  in  order  to  deal  with  the  overdispersion  problem  encountered  in  Poisson 
estimations  of  trade  models. A Vuong  statistic  (Vuong,  1989)  will  authorize  to compare  the 
ZIPPML model with PPML. 
4. Empirical Model and Database 
We use a balanced panel data counting for the export values of 27 Brazilian states and 118 
countries in bilateral terms for the years 1991, 1997, 1998 and 1999. Thus, we can consider that 
the data consists of sub group of pairs that for each a different data source is used.. Totally we use 
the  export  values  of  27  states  between  each  other  (27*26),  their  trade  with  other  countries 
(27*118*2) and the trade of 118 countries between each other (118*117), all for four years and 
balanced for the pairs with missing values while zero values are kept.  9 
 
 The  international  trade  flows  of Brazilian  states are  taken  from ALICEWEB  maintained by 
Foreign Trade Secretariat of the Brazilian Ministry of Development and contain the export and 
imports values of Brazilian states to and from each country. Values of exports of 118 countries 
between each other are taken from Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTs) updated and published 
each  year  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund.  Two  sources  are  in  concordance  and  yet 
combinable  since  they  give  similar  total  export  volumes  for  the  whole  Brazilian  trade  with 
sample countries.  
We also use interstate export flows of Brazilian states for our empirical work. Thanks to its 
internal tax regulation led by the federal system, we have the bilateral export data of Brazilian 
states for the years 1991, 1997, 1998 and 1999. Brazilian authorities use the information coming 
from  ICMS  tax  accounts  in  order  to  measure  the  interstate  trade  flows.  In  fact,  ICMS  tax 
(Imposto sobre Circulação de Mercadorias e Serviços) is a Value Added Tax perceived by the 
exporting State. The Ministry of Finance of Brazil constructed a database for the years 1997, 
1998 and 1999 (Ministério de Fazenda 2001, 2000a, 2000b). For the year 1991, data come from 
SEFAZ-PE (1993) and is measured and extrapolated by the Financial Ministry of Pernambuco 
from the interstate database of 1987. 
 GDP values of the countries are in current dollar and drawn from World Development Indicators 
of  The  World  Bank.  For  Brazilian  states,  the  GDP  values  are  provided  by  IBGE  (Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) in local currency units, in Cruzeiro for 1991 and in Real 
for the following years. Since the exchange rate from Cruzeiro to current dollar terms is not 
provided by WDI, we calculate state to total GDP ratios by using the database of IBGE in local 
currency unit and multiply it with the total GDP of Brazil in current dollars provided by WDI. For 
the  years  1997,  1998,  1999  the  ratios  give  similar  results  with  the  ones  calculated  by  WDI 
exchange rates which is insuring for the 1991 values of states’ GDP.    
Distance and Contiguity variables are taken from CEPII’s distances database. Mostly, the capital 
cities  are  the  main  unit  of  distance  measures,  however  exceptionally  the  data  use  also  the 
economic center as the geographic center of the country. World Gazetteer web site furnishes the 
geographical coordinates of states’ capital from which we calculated the bilateral distances of the 
states between each other and the other countries. The information about the contiguity of states 10 
 
is manipulated manually from Brazilian map. Unfortunately, the lack of data for a longer period 
and the existence of gaps between 1991 and 1997 raise limits on the work. However, we believe 
to be able to cover an important part of the shock provoked by the launching of MERCOSUR 
since it enters in force in the end of November 1991 and is reinforced in 1994 by the Treaty of 
Ouro Preto.   
Our basic gravity model explains bilateral exports by usual variables: GDP of the exporter i and 
importer j and their bilateral distance, contiguity. However, since we work with a cross-section-
time series data, the traditional model should be adjusted for the distortions originating from price 
changes and shocks  in  world  trade.  Thus,  we  introduce  a  time  dummy  for  each  year which 
controls for the fluctuations in dollar prices. Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) advocates as well for 
time  dummies  in  gravity  equation  instead  of  deflating  the  nominal  trade  values  by  the  US 
aggregate price index which they name as “bronze medal mistake” since the common global 
trends in inflation rates rises spurious correlation. We obviously include country-fixed effects as 
previously justified. Our first model is as follows; 
             
(1) 
where  is the export flow between the country (or Brazilian State) pair i and j in year t and 
 is the bilateral distance.   and  are the nominal Gross Domestic Products of 
exporter country/state i and importer country/state j in year t.   takes the value 1 if 
the trade pair ij (state or country) shares a common border which makes them neighbors.   
In Eq(2), we will measure the Brazilian interstate trade for the period after MERCOSUR. We 
introduce as well the trade creation impact of MERCOSUR on its member countries (Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil) and the average impact of six main RTAs (ANDEAN, ASEAN, 
APTA,  CACM,  EC,  NAFTA)  other  than  MERCOSUR  on  bilateral  trade.  Another  interest 
variable in Eq(2) is the impact of MERCOSUR on Brazil’s external trade. We believe for a better 
understanding of to what extent the interstate trade of Brazil depends on the substitution between 
domestic  and  international  market  led  by  the  tariff  changes  with  member  countries,  it  is  an 
important task to see the whole impact of MERCOSUR, the trade diversion as well as the trade 11 
 
creation. Yet, the trade creation not always happens merely at the cost of a decrease in trade 
volumes with nonmember countries, it can also originate from a contraction in domestic market. 
Other  than  measuring  the  evolution  of  interstate  trade,  the  strength  of  Eq(2)  stands  in  its 
comparability with the results in the literature since the reference group used for the measure of 
MERCOSUR impact is the same with other conventional researches in the field, namely the 
exports of 118 countries between each other.  
                                                                                                                             (2) 
=1 when i and j are two states and the year is equal to 1991 (pre-MERCOSUR). 
takes  the  value  1  for  interstate  trade  of  Brazil  for  the  time  period  after  the 
creation of MERCOSUR, namely for the years 1997, 1998 and 1999.   
indicates trade between MERCOSUR members, including the trade between Brazilian states and 
member  countries  for  the  year  1991.  By  including  this  variable,  we  expect  to  estimate  the 
preliminary impact of MERCOSUR and see if there has been an increase in the trade of member 
countries after MERCOSUR.   is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for the 
export  flows  from  Brazilian  states  to  non-MERCOSUR  countries  in  t=1991.  This  indicator 
shows Brazil’s integration level to international market in 1991, so that we can see its evolution 
after  the  launching  of  MERCOSUR.  is  the  same  variable  for  the  post-
MERCOSUR period. In fact, all these dummies in Eq(2) must be interpreted relatively to the 
reference  group,  namely  the  bilateral  trade  of  countries  which  don’t  belong  to  an  RTA 
(MERCOSUR or other RTAs). The change in their trade structure provoked by MERCOSUR can 
only be amplified by comparing pre- and post-MERCOSUR years.  
The impact of an RTA is not uniform for the whole period. As mentioned by Frankel (1997) the 
time before and  after  the  agreement  goes into  effect  has  an  impact  over  the  extent  of  trade 
creation  and  trade  diversion  considered.  According  to  Magee  (2008),  the  agreement  has  no 
cumulative impact after the 11th year of the implementation.  
Thus, in Eq(3), we will decompose the interstate trade for each year by always using the pooled 
cross-section-time series data.  We believe this method to be better than a strict cross-section 12 
 
analysis driven for each  year.  In fact, in cross-section analysis, we use a gravity benchmark 
which is different for each year and so vulnerable for yearly fluctuations and shocks in world 
trade. On the other hand, in a pooled panel data, since we use a unique control group for all years, 
the coefficients are comparable between each other and in time
2.   
                    (3) 
Once we consider each Brazilian state as a separate trade entity, we can study the trade creation 
and the trade diversion effects of a trade agreement at this level.  These static effects can vary 
depending on the regional differences in production structure. In Brazilian case, it is particularly 
important to decompose the aggregate impact in regional terms, since the regional disparities in 
states’ economic development levels and the structural differences are very strong in the country. 
These differences fragile the production in certain states with high production costs. In fact, the 
size of TC and TD effects change according to differences in these production costs. On the 
contrary, the internal trade impact can be positive. The more competitive the state, there will be 
more sectors in which it will get specialized after the RTA. The increased specialization of states 
can boost the internal trade, at least between the advantageous ones. Thus, in order to see the size 
and the direction of the internal trade impact, we need to precede an interstate decomposition of 
the aggregate Interstate Trade Impact that we measured in first part. 
Brazil is divided into five macroregions by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE): North, Northeast, Central-West, Southeast, South; see the map in annex). We will use 
this  macro-level  division,  namely  South,  Southeast,  Northeast,  Center-west  and  North.  IBGE 
makes  an  effort  to  gather  the  states  of  similar  cultural,  economical,  historical  and  social 
characteristics under the same region as long as they are geographically clustered. Thus, there is a 
minimum uniformity inside each regional division and the study at regional level will furnish 
sufficiently large amount of information to understand the differences in trade impact.   
                                                 
2 For the curiosity of the reader we made after all an attempt to give the estimation results driven from 
cross-section analysis. Unfortunately, PPML and ZIPPML are not converging for all the years (STATA), 
especially for the year 1991 which is essential in order to evaluate MERCOSUR impact as being the only 
year in the sample before its creation.     13 
 
In Eq(4), we will introduce bilateral interregional trade variables for the period before and after 
MERCOSUR. Since, our variables are bilateral we have totally 15 ( ) interregional trade 
pairs comprising the trade between the states of the same region.  
                  (4)                    
 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 depending on k which is an index for 15 
regional  pairs  (north-north,  north-south,  north-southeast  etc…).  If  k=north-south  than 
 takes the value 1 for export of a northern state to a southern state as well as the 
export of southern state to northern state in year 1991.    measures the 
aggregate impact for whole MERCOSUR period, but decomposed for each pair of regions.  
In  Eq(5),  we  go  one  step  further  and  measure  the  Trade  Creation  effect  of  MERCOSUR 
individually  for  each  Brazilian  region  and  between  other  member  countries.  Highly  unequal 
regional  economic  structure  of  Brazil  makes  it  necessary  to  decompose  regionally  the 
MERCOSUR  impact.  These  regional  MERCOSUR  variables  measure  the  differences  in 
production  costs  and  economic  specializations  of  the  regions  besides  with  the  possible 
advantages they draw due to their historical close relations with member countries.   
                                          (5)                                                                 
  is  the  MERCOSUR  impact  on  the  trade  of  five  Brazilian  regions  with 
MERCOSUR member countries as well as the member countries between each other, thus totally 
it makes z=6 dummy variables. It is in both directions: export from states in regions to member 
countries and exports of member countries to the region.  14 
 
Lastly, we will see the evolution of the interstate trade between the regions separately for each 
year before and after MERCOSUR. The equation is as follows, 
                                 (6) 
where   is a dummy counting for interstate trade belonging to same or different regions of 
Brazil (k=15) decomposed separately for each year (t=1991, 1997, 1998, 1999). Therefore, we 
have totally k*t dummies in order to measure in details the regional differences in the evolution 
of interstate trade with MERCOSUR.  
5. Results 
The estimation results for models 1 to 3 are furnished in Table 1. 
Table 1:  
Dependent 
variable=ExportCurrent  Model 1  Model 1  Model 2  Model 2  Model 3  Model 3 
   PPML  Logit  ZIPPML  PPML  Logit  ZIPPML  PPML  Logit  ZIPPML 
ln_gdpnominali   .4536886***      .4499205***    .4504992***      .448813***     .4784798***     .4753046*** 
ln_gdpnominalj   .6969415***      .680983***   .7103235***     .6987728***   .7406768***     .7274434*** 
ln_distance   -.8215273***    .3536553***   -.8181211***   -.6211342***  .3536553**  -.6179738***   -.6209514***  .3536553***  -.6178074***  
Contiguity   .6837528***   -1.475198***     .6866379 ***   .6898418 ***  -1.475198***   .6913232***   .6896492***  -1.475198***  .6911453*** 
IST_91            2.591874***       2.544252***   2.607355***       2.558824***  
IST_mercosur            2.460291***      2.416505***          
IST_1997                     2.444005***      2.402448*** 
IST_1998                     2.407612***     2.365111*** 
IST_1999                     2.556148***      2.506924*** 
MERCOSUR_hypo_1991            .5078708***      .4748947**    .5196454***      .4859372** 
MERCOSUR             1.149378***      1.111592***   1.1482***      1.110415*** 
BRZ_INT_t=91           -.9038175***     -.8729523***    -.895696***      -.8653772*** 
BRZ_INT_t=mercosur            -.8341045***      -.8243811***   -.8348414***     -.8251083*** 
RTA            .4071401***     .4157494***   .4078387***     .416392*** 
Constant  -7.202867**   -3.539839***    -5.397823     -9.42369 ***  -3.539839***  -8.653841**   -10.62176**   -3.539839***  -9.786933** 
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes 
Time Dummies  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes 
Huber-White Sandwich 
Estimator  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes 
                   
*** Significant at 1%                   
** Significant at 5%                   
* Significant at 10%                   
                   
 
The basic model (Model 1) gives coefficients very close of those usually found in the literature. 
Both estimations –PPML and ZIPPML- give similar results. The income elasticity is generally 15 
 
inferior to 1 in PPML and ZIPPML and it is reason why we relax the A&vW (2003) hypothesis 
of unitary elasticity. Daumal & Zignago (2010) estimate a coefficient of -.5 with PPML estimator 
by using a database of Brazilian interstate, intrastate and international trade volumes. According 
to logit model specification which is estimated at first place in ZIPPML, an augmentation of 1% 
in distance between two units increases their probability of being in zero trading group in average 
by .35%, while having a common border (Contiguity dummy) decreases this probability by  77% 
(1-exp(-1.4752)).   
In Model 2, we introduce dummy variables which allow the clustering of bilateral relations for 
certain groups however; their coefficients must be interpreted relatively to the reference group 
that is the bilateral trade between countries not involved in one of the considered RTAs. All 
coefficients are significant. The coefficients of inter-state trade are higher than coefficients for 
intra-MERCOSUR trade over the whole period. The coefficients for external trade with third 
countries are significantly negative. The first conclusion is that Brazilian “border effect” exists: 
Brazilian states trade more between each other than they do with foreign countries even inside 
MERCOSUR and, in average; their integration to world trade is relatively weak. The second 
conclusion concerns the comparison between the pre- and the post-MERCOSUR period. The 
coefficients of inter-state (IST) and international (BRZ_INT) trade are not significantly affected 
although they are slightly lower, while intra-MERCOSUR trade is significantly higher after the 
implementation  of  MERCOSUR  than  the  pre-MERCOSUR  period.  These  first  results  are 
coherent with the hypothesis that MERCOSUR had a trade creation effect inside the area without 
diverting trade between the Brazilian states and with third countries. 
If we refine the analysis by fragmenting the IST variable in order to identify the differences over 
four available years (Model 3), we confirm the previous conclusion: MERCOSUR does not seem 
to have affected the Brazilian inter-state trade.  
The regional decomposition of IST and MERCOSUR variables is given in Table 2. As reported 
in model 4, inter- and intra-regional trade of Brazilian states is higher than the average trade 
within MERCOSUR members which is an evidence for the existence of Border effect across the 
whole country. Nevertheless, the intra-regional trade in the North of the country is less than the 
average MERCOSUR trade in post-MERCOSUR period. This can be considered as an evidence 
for the high fragmentation between the states of the region and their disadvantageous production 16 
 
costs which render the MERCOSUR members a strong rival against the Northern states in the 
regional market once the tariff rates decrease.  
In the last column of Model 4, we calculated the differences between the coefficients estimated 
for the  post- and pre-MERCOSUR period by Model 4 and pursued a Fisher test. The differences 
are mostly negative however negligible, since either they are insignificant or the change in their 
values is very small. The only exception seems to be the difference in the bilateral trade of the 
states of Northern and Center-West regions which is positive and statistically significant at 5% 
level. A possible change in the industrial specialization patterns of the regions could have created 
complementary sectors located in two regions and generate an increase in their bilateral trade 
volumes. However, a more detailed research led at industrial level is necessary to conclude with 
the case of North-Center-West trade.                
Table 2: 
Dependent variable=ExportCurrent  Model 4  Model 5 
   Logit  ZIPPML  Difference for t=mercosur  Logit  ZIPPML  Difference for t=mercosur 
Interstate trade over years and among regions                   
 IST_nord91      1.826652***  -.8955626*      2.230672***  -.896092* 
 IST_sud91     2.604844***   .010739     2.945627***  .010664 
 IST_nest91     4.330246***  -.186261      5.000114***  -.186367 
 IST_sest91     1.807291***  -.057422      2.358602***  -.05752 
IST_couest91     4.369643***   -.298923      4.805954***  -.29905 
 IST_n_s91     2.452858***  -.118391      2.826541***  -.118874 
IST_n_nest91     2.922055***  -.115267      3.459841***  -.115718 
IST_n_sest91     2.789678***  -.033497      3.269658***   -.034042 
IST_n_couest91     2.203142***   .768839**     2.623637***  .768289** 
IST_s_nest91     3.472713***  -.329649**      3.978367***  -.329701** 
IST_s_sest91     2.375598***  -.160373      2.823547***  -.160457 
IST_s_couest91      4.039721***  -.537871**      4.429773***   -.537981** 
IST_nest_sest91     3.334541***  -.212444**      3.946755***  -.212544** 
IST_nest_couest91      3.408381***  -.037034      3.963378***  -.037135 
IST_sest_couest91      3.263577***  -.117373      3.758797***  -.117467 
IST_nord      .9310894*          1.33458**    
IST_sud      2.615583***         2.956291***    
IST_nest      4.143985***          4.813747***    
IST_sest      1.749869***        2.301082***    
IST_couest     4.07072***        4.506904***    
IST_n_s      2.334467***         2.70764***    
IST_n_nest      2.806788***         3.344123***    
IST_n_sest     2.756181***         3.235616***    
IST_n_couest     2.971981***        3.391926***    
IST_s_nest      3.143064***        3.648666***    
IST_s_sest      2.215225***          2.66309***    
IST_s_couest     3.50185***         3.891792***    
IST_nest_s~t      3.122097***          3.734211***    
IST_nest_c~t      3.371347***         3.926243***    17 
 
IST_sest_c~t      3.146204***           3.64133***    
RTAs and International trade of Brazil                   
MERCOSUR_hypo(t=1991)      .4458341**         .651793***    
MERCOSUR      1.086265***              
MERCOSUR_nord              .2648969    
MERCOSUR_sud               .9924192***    
MERCOSUR_nest               2.067599***    
MERCOSUR_sest              1.502501***    
MERCOSUR_couest               1.003783***    
MERCOSUR_omembers                1.068209***    
BRZ_INT(t=91)     -.8805249***        -.6235276***    
BRZ_INT(t=mercosur)      -.8241265***         -.5675654***    
RTA      .4025257***         .401502***    
Basic gravity equation                   
ln_gdpnominali      .4476799***        .4476088***    
ln_gdpnominalj     .6986994***        .6986668***    
ln_distance  .3536553***   -.62179***      .3536553***    -.6215608***     
Contiguity  -1.475198***   .7047674***     -1.475198***   .7077635***     
Constant  -3.539839***   -9.0801***      -3.539839***  -9.469284***     
Exporter Fixed Effects     Yes        Yes    
Importer Fixed Effects     Yes        Yes    
Time Dummies     Yes        Yes    
Huber-White Sandwich Estimator     Yes        Yes    
*** Significant at 1%             
** Significant at 5%             
* Significant at 10%             
In Model 5, decomposing the MERCOSUR impact among the regions, we found that the trade 
between the Northern states and MERCOSUR members are less important than it is for the other 
regions and smaller than the country average (1.086). This result reveals the unequal gains drawn 
by  the  Brazilian  regions  from  MERCOSUR  after  controlling  for  the  geographical  closeness 
(distance and contiguity) and country fixed effects. Hence, it strengthens the assumption that 
there are structural limits to the Northern regions’ integration to international trade which cannot 
be worked off easily.  
In Model 6, we led an estimation decomposing IST variable regionally and on a yearly basis. The 
trade structures of the regions are significantly different from the reference group and are similar 
in size and in sign to the estimation results found in Model 4 and Model 5. However, Fisher tests 
pursued to understand the yearly evolution in the regional structure of trade do not show any 





Dependent variable=ExportCurrent  Model 6 
   Logit  ZIPPML  Dif_1997  Dif_1998  Dif_1999 
Interstate trade over years and among regions                
 IST_nord91     1.836456***  -1.558406**  -1.0448431**  -.215614 
 IST_sud91      2.620704***  -.094243  -.016126  .133514 
 IST_nest91      4.343592***  -.186696  -.252904  -.145774 
 IST_sest91     1.821694***  -.070072  -.120541  -.007702 
IST_couest91      4.387335***  -.195296  -.452715  -.315298 
 IST_n_s91     2.466125***  -.165342  -.199149  .007559 
IST_n_nest91      2.933802***  -.179727  -.292712  .051691 
IST_n_sest91      2.80238***  -.00551  -.109565  .024094 
IST_n_couest91      2.219337***  .712144  .664159  .926761** 
IST_s_nest91      3.486829***  -.386226**  -.388683***  -.222838* 
IST_s_sest91      2.390791***  -.205883  -.21802  -.074207 
IST_s_couest91       4.056434***  -.61042**  -.609038**  -.0404339* 
IST_nest_sest91      3.348389***  -.235212  -.291336**  -.124779 
IST_nest_couest91       3.423771***  -.175211  -.087313  .155891 
IST_sest_couest91      3.279235***  -.135107  -.203287  -.032627 
IST_nord97      .278055          
IST_sud97      2.526461***          
IST_nest97      4.156896***          
IST_sest97      1.751622***          
IST_couest97      4.192039***          
IST_n_s97      2.300783***          
IST_n_nest97      2.754075***          
IST_n_sest97      2.79687***          
IST_n_couest97      2.931481***          
IST_s_nest97      3.100603***          
IST_s_sest97      2.184908***          
IST_s_couest97      3.446016***          
IST_nest_sest97      3.113177***          
IST_nest_couest97       3.24856***          
IST_sest_couest97      3.144128***          
IST_nord98      .7916129          
IST_sud98      2.604578***          
IST_nest98      4.090688***          
IST_sest98      1.701153***          
IST_couest98      3.93462***          
IST_n_s98     2.266976***          
IST_n_nest98      2.64109***          
IST_n_sest98      2.692815***          
IST_n_couest98      2.883496***          
IST_s_nest98      3.098146***          
IST_s_sest98       2.172771***          
IST_s_couest98       3.447396***          
IST_nest_sest98      3.057053***          
IST_nest_couest98       3.336458***          
IST_sest_couest98      3.075948***          
IST_nord99      1.620842***          
IST_sud99      2.754218***          
IST_nest99      4.197818***          
IST_sest99      1.813992***          
IST_couest99      4.072037 ***          19 
 
IST_n_s99      2.473684***          
IST_n_nest99      3.085493***          
IST_n_sest99      2.778286***          
IST_n_couest99      3.146098***          
IST_s_nest99     3.263991***          
IST_s_sest99        2.316584***          
IST_s_couest99      3.652095***          
IST_nest_sest99      3.22361***          
IST_nest_couest99      3.579662***          
IST_sest_couest99       3.246608***           
RTAs and International trade of Brazil                
MERCOSUR_hypo(t=1991)      .4568407**          
MERCOSUR      1.085108***          
BRZ_INT(t=91)     -.8728915***          
BRZ_INT(t=mercosur)       -.8248168***          
RTA      .4031757***          
Basic gravity equation                
ln_gdpnominali     .4739644***           
ln_gdpnominalj     .7274031***           
ln_distance  .3536553***   -.6216225***           
Contiguity   -1.475198***   .7045803***          
Constant  -3.539839***    -10.20891**          
Exporter Fixed Effects     Yes          
Importer Fixed Effects     Yes        
Time Dummies     Yes        
Huber-White Sandwich Estimator     Yes          
*** Significant at 1%           
** Significant at 5%           
* Significant at 10%           20 
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